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The Governmental Context for Natural Resource Development in 
Indian Country 
Susan M. Williams, Gover, Stetson & Williams, Albuquerque! 
No doubt any longer exists that the major force in the 
development of Indian natural resources will be the tribal 
government. That government both owns natural resources and 
regulates their development. 
Against an historical, legal and political backdrop, this 
pr~sentation focuses on the issues facing modern tribal govern-
ments in their quest, responsibly and comprehensively, to manage 
the development of reservation resources. 
I. Overview 
From the earliest years of· the Republic, Indian tribes were 
recognized as "distinct, independent, political communi ties, 11 
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832) and, as such, 
qualified to exercise powers of government, not by virtue of any 
delegation from the federal government, but rather, by reason of 
tribes' original inherent sovereignty. Consistent with this 
doctrine, until recently, courts reviewing the nature of Indian 
tribal powers adhered to three ·fundamental principles: (1) An 
Indian tribe possesses, in· the first instance, all of the powers 
of any sovereign state; (2) Conquest of the tribes by the United 
l This article was originally prepared for the June 1988 
NRLC conference, "Natural Resource Development in Indian Country." 
States rendered tribes subject to the legislative power of the 
United States and, in so doing, terminated the external powers of 
sovereignty of the tribes, such as the power to enter into 
treaties with foreign nations. The loss of external sovereignty, 
however, did not affect the internal sovereignty of the tribes, 
that is the powers of local government; (3) Tribal powers may be 
qualified by treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but 
except where expressly qualified, the full powers of internal 
sovereignty remained vested in the Indian tribes and their duly 
constituted organs of government. 
Over the years Congress has vacillated widely in its 
legislation on 'Indian matters ranging from termination of the 
political existence of certain Indian tribes to efforts to 
support the strengthening of tribal governments. But, important-
ly, until the 1950's, Congress did not derogate the sovereign 
powers of Indian tribes. In the 1950's, however, Congress 
enacted legislation authorizing state authority over Indian 
reservations in such areas as education, and health and welfare. 
In addition, Congress enacted Public Law 280, which curtailed 
federal responsibilities on certain Indian reservations by 
transferring criminal and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over 
Indian Country from the federal government to the states. Other 
states were given the option of assuming jurisdiction over 
reservations on their own. Because of longstanding and continu-
ing tension between states and tribes, these federal policies 
proved extremely detrimental to tribal interests. 
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From the 1960's to the present, Congress abandoned the 
policy of permitting state jurisdiction over reservations in 
favor of a policy of strengthening tribal governments. In 1968, 
Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act which imposed 
constitutional-type limitations on the exercise of tribal 
sovereign powers . Congress authorized only tribal forums , 
h~wever , to hear claims under the Indian Civil Rights Act, except 
for habeus corpus claims which are authorized to be heard in the 
federal courts. In 1974, the Indian Self- Determination and 
Education · Assistance Act was enacted to authorize tribes to 
contract . with the Interior and Health & Human Services Secretar-
ies to operate federal programs for their reservations. In the 
1980's, amendments to the Internal Revenue Code and to the 
Nation ' s air and water quality protection programs authorize 
treatment of tribes as states for purposes of these laws which 
authorize tax benefits and federal grants for governments. In 
short , in the last few years , Congress has given tribal govern-
ments critically needed recognition and financial assistance. 
Courts, in contrast , have rendered decisions in r ecent years 
which depart from the Worcester v. Georgia mandate that tribes be 
treated as sovereigns with powers exclusive as against states 
with respect to reservation affairs. These decisions have struck 
directly at the heart of tribes• internal sovereign powers , by 
seizing from tribes the jurisdiction to prosecute and convict 
non- Indians on their reservations, and jurisdiction over non-
Indians on fee lands within their reservations , except where 
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the non-Indians' conduct threatens the political or economic 
integrity, or health and welfare of the tribe. The courts have 
employed the theory tpa t powers of cr im in~l jurisdiction and 
jurisdiction over non-members on fee lands are inconsistent with 
tribes' dependent . status. Im.portantly, however, in the applica-
tion of these rules, the courts have found ·only in one instance 
that tribal powers exercised over non-Indians on fee lands 
within the reservations are inconsistent with tribes' dependent 
status. The decisions also have struck indirectly at the heart 
of tribes' internal sovereign powers, in upholding state juris-
diction over reservation matters in certain instances. 
In the most recent decision regarding the scope of state 
jurisdiction over Indian lands, the u.s. Supreme Court has made 
clear that only in the area of state taxation does a per se rule 
exist that states lack jurisdiction over Indians on their 
reservations, absent congressional consent. With respect to all 
other state jurisdictional exercises over Indians and non-Indians 
in Indian territory, the courts will employ the federal doctrines 
of preemption and infringement upon tribal self-government 
against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty to determine whether 
sufficient stat~ interests are at stake to outweigh the federal 
interests at stake. In thus opening the door, to some extent, to 
state jurisdiction on reservations, the courts cavalierly and 
perhaps unwittingly have fanned historic and deeply-felt tensions 
between states and tribes at a time when great diplomacy and 
cooperation between states and tribes are critical to the protec-
4 
tion of natural resources , the environment and the i nte r est of 
citi2ens on and near the reservations . But , more importantly, 
the courts have abandoned the framers ' intent embodied in Article 
1 Section 8 of the U. S . Constitution that the federal government 
functions as the paramount authority over Indian affairs, and not 
states, and that Congress and not the courts derive the delicate 
balance between federa l and tribal interests on the one hand , and 
state interests on the other hand , with respect to activities on 
Indian reservations. And, ultimately, that balance ought best to 
be derived by the tribes and the states pursuant to intergovern-
mental agreements. Any other approach necessarily will have the 
effect of destroying meaningful tribal governments. 
With respect to federal authority over reservations , courts 
have held that Congress has " plenary power" over Indian tribes , 
/ 
pursuant to the trust responsibility doctrine discussed in 
another presentation and under Article 1 Section 8 of the u.s . 
Constitution. While in the early years, plenary power was 
held to be virtually an unreviewable power, in more recent 
decisions , courts have made clear that the plenary power means 
Congress has paramount authority over tribes , but that authority 
must be exercised consistent with Congress' unique obligations to 
Indian tribes . Federal courts , in contrast, have · limited 
authority over .disputes involving Indian tribes . The u.S . 
supreme Court has held, for example, that federal courts must 
defer to t r ibal courts to determine the scope of tribal jurisdic-
tion under federal and tribal law. The Court also has held that 
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challenges to the exercise of tribal jurisdiction must be heard 
in tribal and not federal forums. 
II . Tribal sovereign Powers 
A. Statutes 
In -the late 1800 • s, Congress executed a number of treaties 
with Indian tribes, which treaties approved cessions of vast 
Indian land areas in exchange for federal promises of education 
and welfare programs for Indians and exclusively tribal terri-
tories in the United States. Soon after the close of the treaty 
period in the late 1800's, however, Congress enacted the General 
Allotment Act of ·1887, (25 u.s.c. 331, et. seq . ) pursuant to 
which tribal lands were distributed to the adult members of the 
tribes , which members were authorized to sell their land after a 
certain period. The goal of the Act was to transform Indian 
societies into farming and industrial economies. Vast portions 
of Indian lands remaining after -distribution were deemed to be 
"surplus" and open to non-Indian settlement. During this period 
approximately two-thirds of the tribal land base was lost to 
sales of the surplus lands , tax sales and sales of the individu-
ally owned tribal lands . 
The Act, importantly, did not attack tribal sovereign 
powers. In 1934, Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act, 
(25 u.s.c. 461, et. seq . ) which authorized a procedure for tribes 
to enact constitutions for their tribal governments, and recog-
nized tribes as appropriate vehicles for implementing federal 
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Indian policies. This Act was the first congressional recogni-
tion of the right of Indian people to maintain distinct, politi-
cal communities. 
In the 1950's, however, Congress reversed its policy of the 
strengthening of tribal gov,ernments by enacting legislation which 
authorized the termination of the political existence of certain 
tribes, and the assimilation of individual Indians into state 
society. In 1955, Congress enacted Public Law 280, (18 u.s.c. 
Sect. 1162, 25 u.s.c. Sects. 1321-1326, 28 u.s.c. Sects. 1360, 
1360 note) which curtailed federal responsibilities on certain 
Indian reservations by transferring criminal and civil adjudica-
tory jurisdiction over Indian Country from the federal government 
to the states. Some states were given the option of assuming 
jurisdiction over reservation areas on their own. Not until 
l96S, however, was a requirement imposed of tribal consent to the 
acquisition of such jurisdiction. In other 1950's legislation 
Congress transferred certain responsibilities to states for the 
health and education of Indians (25 u.s.c. Sect. 231). 
In. the 1960's, the federal termination pol icy was reversed 
by the continuing federal policy of strengthening tribal govern-
ments and promoting the development of Indian reservation 
economies. Through a series of legislative enactments, including 
the Indian Self-Determination Education Assistance Act of 1974, 
(25 U.s.c. Sects. 450-450n, 455-458c), the Indian Financing Act 
of 1974, (25 u.s.c. Sects. 1451-1453), the Indian Tribal Govern-
ment Tax Status Act of 1982, (26 u.s.c. Sect. 7871), the Safe 
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Drinking Water Act of 1987 and the Clean Water Act of 1988, 
Congress has enacted laws which put great force behind these 
policies. The Self-Determination Act permits. tribes to contract 
with the federal government to operate federal programs for their 
reservations. The Financing Act authorizes loans, grants and 
loan guarantees to Indian tribes and tribal organizations for 
economic development. The Tax Status Act accords to tribes 
certain federal tax immunities and the authority to issue debt 
obligations, the interest on which is tax exempt. All of these 
enactments are critical stepping stones for tribes to enter the 
modern era of tribal governments. The Water Acts treat tribes as 
states for purposes of designing and managing federally-subsi-
dized water quality protection programs. 
B. Judicial Decisions 
In Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 559 (1832), the 
u.s. Supreme Court described Indian tribes as distinct, indepen-
dent and political communities. In holding that the state of 
Georgia did not have jurisdiction to regul~te non-Indians on the . 
Cherokee reservation, the Court noted, "the Cherokee Nation, 
then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory with 
boundaries ~ccurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can 
have no force, in which the citizens of Georgia have no right to 
enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in 
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The 
whole intercourse between the United States and this Nation, is, 
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by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the 
United States ••• " 6 Pet. at 560-561. Consistent with Worces-
!!!_, in 1872 in Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1405, 
appeal dismissed, 203 u.s. 599 (1906)), the Supreme Court 
affirmed the right of tribes to impose taxes upon non-Indians in 
the tribal territories. In 1934, the Solicitor for the Depart-
ment of the Interior issued an opinion entitled "The Powers of 
Indian Tribes," which opinion made clear that Indian tribes have 
extensive powers over their own territories, including powers 
over non-Indians who reside or conduct business in those terri-
tories. The Solicitor also made clear that tribes possess all of 
their aboriginal sovereign powers except those removed expressly 
by Congress. ~' 55 I .D. 14 (1934). 
From 1934 until the late 1970's, however, the courts had 
little opportunity to opine on the powers of Indian tribes. When 
they did, the courts departed radically from the worcester 
doctrine. In 1978, the u.s. Supreme Court ruled that Indian 
tribes, by virtue of their dependent status, impliedly have lost 
the power to prosecute and convict non-Indians on their reserva-
tions. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 u.s. 191 (1978). 
I 
In 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that the tribes may regulate 
non-Indians on fee lands within their reservations only where the 
activities of the non-Indians are based on consensual relation-
ships with the tribes or whose conduct threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, 
or the health or welfare of the tribe. See, Montana v. United 
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States , 450 u.s. 544 (1981). 
cantly, courts have upheld 
Under the Montana test , signifi-
extensive tribal powers over 
non-Indians even on fee lands on the reserva~ions such as the 
power to impose health regulations. ~' for example , Cardin 
v. DeLaCruz, 671 F . 2d. 363, ' 9th Cir. (1981) cert . denied, 459 
u.s. 967 (1982). In 1982, the Supreme Court ruled that tribes 
have the inherent sovereign power to tax non- Indian oil and gas 
lessees on the tribal lands . Merrion v . Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
455 u.s. 130 (1982) . In sum, the courts have ruled that tribal 
sovereign powers extend broadly over both Indians and non- Indians 
on the reservations. Tribal : sovereignty , however , is rendered 
meaningless to the ··.extent that the United States supervises that 
sovereignty, and if state governments are to exercise competing 
jurisdiction on the reservations. 
State Sover eign Powers 
A. Congressional Enactment s 
Congress , as noted above , in the 1950 ' s , enacted legislation 
which had the effect of authorizing transf~rs of civil adjudica-
tory and criminal jurisdiction from the federal government to 
state governments, and of state authority over certain education 
and health matters on the reservations. But before and since 
that time, Congress ' pol icy has been to support the strengthening 
of triba l governments and development of I ndian reservation 
economies and not to authorize state jurisdiction on the reserva-
tions. 
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B. Judicial Decisions 
In Worcester v. Georgia, the foundation of Indian law, the 
u.s. Supreme Court held that states have no jurisdiction on 
Indian reservations. From Worcester in 1832 to the 1950's, 
however, the Court had no opportunity to rule again on the scope 
of state powers over Indian reservations. In 1958, the u.s. Su-
preme Court ruled that state courts lack the jurisdiction to 
adjudicate disputes involving Indian defendants on the reserva-
tion, because such jurisdiction would infringe upon tribal 
self-government in conflict with federal law and policy. ~, 
Williams · v. tee, 358 u.s. 217, (1959). Importantly, in reaching 
its decision in Williams, the Supreme Court did not rely upon the 
per se rule articulated in Worcester, that is that the states 
have no jurisdiction on the reservations absent congressional 
consent. Instead, the Court analyzed the relevant treaties and 
federal policies to determine that the particular state jurisdic-
tion sought to be exercised is in conflict with federal law. 
In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled states lack jurisdiction to 
tax Indians on their reservations. ~, . McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Commission, 484 F.2d. 221 (1971), ~· 411 u.s. 164 
(1973). Again, in McClanahan, the Court did not adopt a per se 
rule that state jurisdiction does not exist absent congressional 
consent. Instead, the Court looked to the relevant treaties and 
laws to determine that state taxation of Indians on reservations 
was in conflict with the relevant treaty and federal laws. 
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State jurisdiction over non-Indians is subject _to a similar 
analysis of the governing federal laws and treaty. In Warren 
Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 380 u.s. 685 
(1965), the supreme Court ruled invalid sta~e sales taxes imposed 
on non-Indian traders on reservations on the ground that such 
taxes are preempted by the pervasive federal laws and regulations 
governing traders. The Court reasoned that state taxes would 
interfere with the purpose of the pervasive federal regulation, 
which is to ensure that Indians are charged fair prices. 
In the 1980's, the Court on several occasions reviewed 
state assertions of jurisdiction - over Indian reservations •• In . 
most of these decisions, the Court held that federal law preclud-
ed states from taxing even non-Indians on the reservations. In 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 488 u.s . 136 (1980}, for 
example, the Court invalidated Arizona's motor carrier license 
and fuel use taxes as applied to a non-Indian enterprise that had 
a logging contract with a tribally owned enterprise. The Court 
declared that where a state asserts authority over non-Indian~ on 
a reservation in a fashion that conflicts wi.th federally protect-
ed Indian interests, the state jurisdiction must fail unless 
countervailing state interests are shown. In White Mountain, the 
Court found ~he federal regulatory scheme governing the harvest-
ing of tribal timber comprehensive and pervasive, and devoted to 
the maximizing of tribal timber receipts. State taxes, the Court 
reasoned, would undermine that federal purpose. The Court then 
analyzed the state interests at stake and found that the state 
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interests were marginal because the state did not provide 
governmental services on the reservation to the taxpayers. The 
Court then balanced the state interests against the federal and 
tribal interests and concluded that the state taxes must be 
preempted under federal law because the balance tipped in favor 
of the federal and tribal interests. 
In washington v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 100 s. ct. 
2069 (1980), in contrast, the Couxt held ~he state may tax 
non-Indian purchasers of cigaxettes from Indian retailers, 
because no federal pervasive regulations, no federal interests, 
and no re'servation-generated value were at stake. In short, in 
balance, the state interests were weightier because the Indians 
essentially were marketing only tax exemptions. 
Thus, at . least until 1987, the general rules appeared to be 
that state jurisdiction over non-Indians on a reservation did not 
exist unless the state could show that it had sufficient inter-
ests at stake, such as governmental services provided to the 
reservation taxpayers, and that competing federal and tribal laws 
and policies wexe not endangered. State jurisdiction over 
Indians on a reservation, in contrast, did not lie in the absence 
of express federal consent. 
In 1987, however, the u.s. Supreme Court rendered a landmark 
decision that appears to have turned these longstanding rules on 
their head. In California v. California Band of Mission Indians, 
107 s. Ct. 1083 (1987), the Court ruled that in the absence of 
express congressional consent and except for the area of state 
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taxation (where the worcester rule remains applicable), state 
civil regulatory jurisdiction over even tribes and tribal members 
on their reservations turns on whether state authority is 
preempted by operation of federal law or infringes upon the right 
of self-government. In other words, state jurisdiction over 
Indians is not per se invalid but will turn on the balance of 
governmental interests. In Cabazon, the Court liberally found 
strong federal and tribal interests and concluded that the 
application of California statutes and regulations to tribally-
-owned bingo enterprises infringed impermissibly on tribal 
government and, in light of ~the federal policy of Indian self-
-determination and tribal economic development, was preempted by 
federal law. The state, importantly, could point to no services 
delivered to the tribal bingo enterprises or any other interest. 
Query how state taxing jurisdiction over Indians is any more 
detriment~! than any other form of state regulatory jurisdiction 
over Indians · on a reservation. A per se rule would appear 
appropriate for all forms of state civil regulatory jurisdiction 
over Indians on the reservations. 
In 1988, the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion, a 9th 
Circuit decision holding that the state of Montana could not 
impose high severance and gross proceeds taxes on coal mined by a 
non-Indian company on the Crow Reservation. The Court found the 
taxes impeded production and sales, thereby impairing the 
congressional objectives of encouraging maximum tribal benefits 
from the tribal coal and tribal self-government and economic 
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development. Under the balancing test, the state could point to 
no services or other state interest sufficient to support the tax 
and accordingly, the Court concluded the taxes must fail because 
they infringed impermissibly upon the tribe's ability to raise 
revenues for government and economic development. ~' ~ 
Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819, F.2d. 895, 9th Cir. (1987), 
affirmed without opinion, 56 u.s.L.W. 3450, (1988). 
At the current time, yet another theory for limiting state 
jurisdiction over even non-Indians on a . reservation, may be 
tested in the u.s. Supreme Court. In Cotton Petroleum v. State 
of New Mexico, the non-Indian oil and gas lessees in the Jicaril-
la Apache Reservation have sought review of a New Mexico Court of 
Appeals decision which holds that the interstate commerce clause 
does not preclude the State of New Mexico's taxing Cotton's 
~everance of oil and gas from the reservation at a rate of about 
five times the value of services delivered back to Cotton 
Petroleum on the reservation. The foundation for the claim is 
that tribes can be treated as states for purposes of the inter-
state commerce clause and accordingly, the . State of New Mexico 
and the Jicarilla Apache Tribe must apportion between the two 
taxes imposed on Cotton Petroleum. The Court has noted probable 
jurisdiction and has requested briefs on whether tribes can be 
treated as states for purposes of the interstate commerce 
clause. Tribes are opposed vigorously to this case on the 
grounds that the Indian commerce clause, which historically has 
been a shield against state taxation, is the proper theory of the 
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case. Cotton also has claimed in its brief to the Court that 
Federal preemption grounds exist as a bar to the state tax. 
In sum, while the Court has usurped the congressional role 
deciding the delicate question of whether state jurisdiction 
should lie on reservations in particular cases, the Court is 
applying the Federal preemption test employed for this purpose in 
a liberal fashion in favor of tribes. Cotton is a test of 
whether this trend will continue with the new Court.2 
III. Federal Power 
The United States has a trust responsibility in the manage-
ment of Indian assets, based on the federal ownership of the 
legal title to Indian lands, and the Indian commerce clause of 
the u.s. Constitution, and many statutes enacted by Congress 
articulating the trust responsibility. Congress also has been 
held by courts to have plenary power over Indian tribes. The 
scope of federal power and restraints on it are critical ques-
tions for tribal governments. In the early days, the courts 
viewed the plenary power as equivalent to ~he power of Congress 
over matters involving foreign states, a power that is virtually 
unreviewable. In more recent times, however, the courts have 
held the Congress accountable under the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to legislate with respect to Indian tribes in a 
2 An alternate barrier to state taxes is a claim that the 
t~xes infringe upon tribal self-government. See, Williams 
v. Lee. The Supreme Court, however, has not decided a case on 
this ground since Williams. 
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manner that is tied rationally to Congress' unique obligation to 
Indians. Delaware Tribal Business Community v. weeks, 430 
u.s. 73, 83-85 (1977). 
In recognition of the federal policy of supporting tribal 
self-government, the u.s. Supreme Court has held that federal 
courts must defer to tribal courts to determine the scope of 
tribal jurisdiction under federal and tribal law. National 
Farmers Life Insurance Company v. Crow Tribe, 471 u.s. 845 
(1985). And, moreover, courts have held t -hat the exercise of 
tribal jurisdiction that is valid under federal and tribal law is 
not subject to review in the federal courts. ~, Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 40 {1978). 
In the next few years the increasing tension between the 
conflicting objectives of more aggressive federal management of 
trust assets and tribal self-determination may yield a redefini-
tion of the federal role in Indian affairs. Perhaps that role 
will be execution of the trust so as to equip tribes to manage 
their own resources. 
IV. Building Hodern 'Tribal Government Institutions 
Due to the historic wildly fluctuating federal Indian 
policies--varying from terminating the existence of Indian tribes 
to supporting the strengthening of tribal governments--modern 
tribal government institutions, in a real sense, are in infancy. 
The tribes, as a direct result, face numerous obstacles as they 
attempt to design modern tribal government institutions and 
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implement the tribes' inherent sovereign powers. Critical during 
this era is the exercise of sovereign powers so as to preclude 
the intrusion of unwanted state and other government jurisdiction 
in tribal reservation matters and to regiin the role of tribes as 
I 
the paramount sovereign on the reservations. In developing 
government institutions , however, tribes are being careful to 
design institutions that fit the tribal societies' cultures and 
limitations, and which have the ability of interacting produc-
tively with surrounding governments. 
V. Obstacles 
A. Jurisdictional Dncertainties 
I 
As this article has shown, tribal powers over the reserva-
tions are quite broad, although some uncertainty remains where 
jurisdic t ion over non-Indians on fee lands is sought to be 
exercised. The major source of uncertainty, however, is the 
specter o f competing state jurisdiction, which specter will 
lessen over time as tribal governments mature and, as a result, 
tribal services are delivered and tribal regulation supplants 
state regulation. 
B. Federal Intrusions 
Many tribes have no constitutions to confirm delegations of 
certain inherent sovereign powers by the tribal people to a 
tribal government. For other tribes, tribal constitutions 
adopted pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act, which consti-
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tutions were drafted in boiler plate form and promoted by 
Interior Department officials, are extremely undermining of 
tribal government ~ These constitutions typically vest extensive 
control over tribal government enactments in the Secretary of the 
Interior and limit the powers of tribes with respect to non-mem-
bers. None of these limitations were required by the Indian 
Reorganization Act or other law, and now many tribes must amend 
tribal constitutions to reflect better the true sovereign status 
of tribes. Amending such constitutions; however, is a very 
formidable task. 
c. Instabilities 
Tribes are viewed by many as unstable in light of the rapid 
turnover in ' tribal leadership. In part, this rapid turnover is 
due to the constitutions which have been imposed upon the 
tribes. In another sense, the tribal people have little appre-
ciation of the need for more stable government. That apprecia-
tion, however, is growing. In addition, tribal economies are 
based largely on federal and tribal government programs. To the 
extent a private economy exists, it typically is based on one 
natural resource base or another singular economic activity. 
Accordingly, tribal economies are very vulnerable to outside 
influences such as changes in the prices of oil or changes in 
federal policy. Tribes need to diversify their economies and 
promote more or non-federally based economies. 
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n D. Reconstruction 
Few tribes have a private economy on the reservations which 
provide a needed tax base; federal · funds are drying up rapidly. 
Accordingly , tribes are face~ with the twin needs of producing a 
private economy upon which taxes can be levied to provide 
essential governmental services and the tribal institutions 
needed to shepherd the tribal economies. 
In structuring modern tribal government institutions, tribes 
start with virtually nothing. Mos~ tribes have a legislature and 
a 1 im i ted executive branch. Increasingly, tribes are adopting 
their own tribal courts and supplanting so-called code of federal 
regulations courts, which essentially are federal instrumentali-
ties. On the one hand, starting with nothing means many hills 
are yet to be climbed; on t he other hand, tribes have the unique 
opportunity of learning from the mistakes of states and local 
governments in designing modern tribal governmental institutions 
that address the priority needs of the Indian tribes. 
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VI. Opportunities 
In establishing modern tribal governmental institutions, 
tribes have the benefit of several recent congressional enact-
ments which provide valuable federal tax benefits for tribal 
government activities, and that provide tribes with opportunities 
to obtain valuable federal financing to create enterprises and 
water quality protection programs on their reservations. ~, 
Indian Financing Act of 1974, Indian Tribal Governmental Tax 
Status Act of 1982, Clean water Act o£ 1987, and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act of 1987. Congress at the present time, 
moreover, is considering legislation which would provide addi-
tional valuable federal tax benefits to economic development 
activities on Indian reservations and that would provide a 
federal institution with the ability to lend financing and buy 
equities to promote tribal economies. ~, Indian Economic 
Development Act, 1987, pending, and Indian Finance Development 
Corporation Act of 1987, pending. Tribes and Indian-owned 
enterprises also enjoy valuable state and federal tax immunities 
that make reservation development more attractive. 
VII. conclusion 
In designing modern tribal government institutions and in 
exercising tribes' inherent sovereign powers, tribes increasingly 
are taking over the responsibilities of governance on the 
reservations. In addition, tribes increasingly are interested in 
having something to say about federal supervision of tribal trust 
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assets. The primary objective of tribal governments in the next 
decade will be to achieve the status as the primary sovereign on 
the reservations. 
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